Making Decisions under Ambiguity: Judgment Bias Tasks for Assessing Emotional State in Animals by Sanne Roelofs et al.
REVIEW
published: 09 June 2016
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00119
Making Decisions under Ambiguity:
Judgment Bias Tasks for Assessing
Emotional State in Animals
Sanne Roelofs 1*, Hetty Boleij 2,3, Rebecca E. Nordquist 1,3 and Franz Josef van der Staay 1,3
1 Department of Farm Animal Health, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, Behavior and Welfare Group (Formerly Emotion
and Cognition Group), Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands, 2 Department of Animals in Science and Society, Faculty
of Veterinary Medicine, Division of Laboratory Animal Science, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands, 3 Brain Center Rudolf
Magnus, Utrecht University, Utrecht, Netherlands
Edited by:
Angela Roberts,
University of Cambridge, UK
Reviewed by:
Rafal Rygula,
Institute of Pharmacology Polish
Academy of Sciences, Poland
Christopher Heath,




Received: 14 March 2016
Accepted: 25 May 2016
Published: 09 June 2016
Citation:
Roelofs S, Boleij H, Nordquist RE and
van der Staay FJ (2016) Making
Decisions under Ambiguity:
Judgment Bias Tasks for Assessing
Emotional State in Animals.
Front. Behav. Neurosci. 10:119.
doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2016.00119
Judgment bias tasks (JBTs) are considered as a family of promising tools in the
assessment of emotional states of animals. JBTs provide a cognitive measure of
optimism and/or pessimism by recording behavioral responses to ambiguous stimuli. For
instance, a negative emotional state is expected to produce a negative or pessimistic
judgment of an ambiguous stimulus, whereas a positive emotional state produces a
positive or optimistic judgment of the same ambiguous stimulus. Measuring an animal’s
emotional state or mood is relevant in both animal welfare research and biomedical
research. This is reflected in the increasing use of JBTs in both research areas. We
discuss the different implementations of JBTs with animals, with a focus on their potential
as an accurate measure of emotional state. JBTs have been successfully applied to
a very broad range of species, using many different types of testing equipment and
experimental protocols. However, further validation of this test is deemed necessary.
For example, the often extensive training period required for successful judgment bias
testing remains a possible factor confounding results. Also, the issue of ambiguous
stimuli losing their ambiguity with repeated testing requires additional attention. Possible
improvements are suggested to further develop the JBTs in both animal welfare and
biomedical research.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the framework of animal welfare studies as well as in biomedical studies, assessment of
the emotional state of an animal can yield highly relevant information. The majority of studies
on animal emotions (most of them using rodent species) address anxiety, which is assessed
with classical tests such as the open field test (OF), the light-dark (LD) test and the plus-maze
(PM) test (for a recent critique of these tests see Ennaceur, 2014). These tests measure the
unconditioned response of an animal to an unfamiliar situation (the testing environment) that
contains elements which the animal perceives as adverse/threatening (such as open space and/or
high light intensities). They may be less suited for assessing emotion in non-rodent species
such as pigs (see, e.g., Murphy et al., 2014). Instead of looking at the animal’s response to
unconditioned stimuli, one may use cognitive tests to assess emotion in animals, such as judgment
bias tasks (JBTs; Harding et al., 2004; Paul et al., 2005; Murphy et al., 2013), or (variants of) decision
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making tasks (Murphy et al., 2015). Affective reactions may
provide useful feedback, both explicitly and implicitly, from
emotional appraisal processes (Storbeck and Clore, 2007).
According to Marchant-Forde (2015), the most influential recent
studies measuring emotional state as an index of animal welfare
are those assessing judgment (cognitive) bias. Bateson and Nettle
(2015) consider JBTs as the ‘‘gold standard’’ for measuring
the mood of animals. In the area of biomedical research,
cognitive bias research is still in its infancy, although the
number of studies using this type of task is growing. Besides
its value for the purpose of welfare assessment, within the
area of biomedical research, the affective state of an animal
may be a confound for other behavioral tests and a source of
uncontrolled variation (Bateson and Nettle, 2015). Knowledge
of the animals’ emotional state may contribute to understanding
test results.
Emotion, Cognition and Judgment Bias
Emotions are adaptive processes that help individuals react
adequately to internal or external stimuli, thereby avoiding harm
and seeking valuable resources, while cognition can be described
as information processing mechanisms. Emotions cannot be
regarded separately from cognition. Emotional states affect
cognitive processes and conversely cognitive processes are often
the initiators of emotions (Lazarus, 1982; Dolcos, 2015). The
interdependence of emotion and cognition is reflected in the
definition by Kleinginna and Kleinginna, (1981 p. 355):
• ‘‘Emotion is a complex set of interactions among subjective
and objective factors, mediated by neural–hormonal systems,
which can
• (a) give rise to affective experiences such as feelings of arousal,
pleasure/displeasure;
• (b) generate cognitive processes such as emotionally relevant
perceptual effects, appraisals, labeling processes;
• (c) activate widespread physiological adjustments to the
arousing conditions; and
• (d) lead to behavior that is often, but not always, expressive,
goal-directed, and adaptive.’’
The brain cannot be divided in cognitive and affective regions,
since ‘‘affective’’ brain regions are also involved in cognition and
brain regions that are viewed as cognitive are also involved in
emotions. Cognition and emotion are integrated in the brain
(Pessoa, 2008). Brain structures at the heart of the neural circuitry
for emotion (e.g., the amygdala) impact cognitive processing
from early attention allocation (Holland and Gallagher, 1999)
through perceptual processing to memory (Phelps, 2006).
Similarly, brain structures involved in the neural circuitry for
cognition, such as dorsomedial and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex (DMPFC and VLPFC), have an intrinsic role in the
experience of emotion (Barrett et al., 2007).
If one regards emotion as a result of an anticipated,
experienced, or imagined outcome of an adaptationally relevant
transaction between organism and environment, cognitive
processes are always crucial in the elicitation of an emotion
(Lazarus, 1982). Cognitive processes are closely linked to
emotional states as they are, for example, necessary for the
appraisal of environmental cues and for the ‘‘production’’ of
emotions (Lazarus, 1982; Mathews and MacLeod, 1994). On the
other hand, emotional states influence information processing in
the brain, which helps individuals to react appropriately within
a certain context (Mathews et al., 1997). Emotional influences
on cognition are defined as cognitive biases, of which three
types can be distinguished: attention biases, memory biases,
and interpretation or judgment biases (see Paul et al., 2005).
However, ascribing a reaction to a cue or stimulus to a cognitive
bias implies that there is an unbiased, verifiable truth. It is,
therefore, better to consider this phenomenon as result of
‘‘decision under ambiguity’’, i.e., ‘‘judgment bias’’ instead of
‘‘cognitive bias’’. Attention bias occurs in threatening situations
as a result of an anxious emotional state and is characterized by
an increased attention to negative and threatening cues (Mathews
and MacLeod, 1994; Mogg and Bradley, 1998). Memory bias
refers to the fact that events associated with positive or negative
emotions are more readily remembered than neutral events, and
includes memory storage, consolidation and retrieval processes
(Cahill and McGaugh, 1996; Hamann et al., 1999). It is likely
though, that the effects on memory are caused by high arousal
and not by the valence of the emotion (Bradley et al., 1992).
Judgment bias or interpretation bias (from now on referred to
as judgment bias) refers to the influence of emotions on the
interpretation of ambiguous information (Mathews et al., 1989;
Eysenck et al., 1991; Richards and French, 1992).
There are numerous operational definitions of judgment bias.
Combining definitions of Boleij et al. (2012) and Bateson and
Nettle (2015),
A judgment bias is a relative reaction to an ambiguous
stimulus, expressing an ‘‘interpretation’’ of this stimulus and an
‘‘expectation’’ about the consequences of the reaction (Boleij et al.,
2012). In JBTs ‘‘(. . .) animals that respond to the ambiguous
stimuli similarly to the positive stimulus are interpreted as
displaying a high expectation of reward in the presence of
ambiguous information, and hence an ‘‘optimistic’’ cognitive style
indicative of a positive affective state. In contrast, animals that
respond to the ambiguous stimuli similarly to the negative stimulus
are interpreted as displaying a higher expectation of punishment
or lower expectation of reward, and hence a more ‘‘pessimistic’’
cognitive style indicative of a more negative affective state’’.
—(Bateson and Nettle, 2015, p. 3).
The processing of current information and the resulting
behavioral choices are affected by optimism and pessimism
(Dember et al., 1989). In JBTs, optimism is operationally defined
‘‘as a higher proportion of responses to an ambiguous cue as if it
were the cue predicting the positive outcome, and pessimism as a
higher proportion of responses to an ambiguous cue as if it were
the cue predicting the negative outcome’’ (Douglas et al., 2012,
p. 66). JBTs thus are believed to provide a cognitive measure of
mood (Bateson et al., 2015; Mellor, 2015).
Aim of this Review
Since its introduction as a test for use in animals just a decade
ago (Harding et al., 2004), a considerable number of JBTs
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has been developed and applied in scientific studies, using
a broad range of procedures and test equipment, in a large
number of species (see ‘‘Supplementary Material, Table 1’’,
summarizing the publications about JBTs with animals as
subjects). For continued (translational) research on animal
emotions using these tasks, JBTs have to be validated and
adapted to the abilities of each of these species (Anderson
et al., 2012). Here, we review the different implementations
of this task, and a number of questions to be solved, such as
the cues and test arena’s used, measuring response latencies
vs. categorizing responses as Go/No-go, and species-specific
modifications. We discuss the potential of JBTs as a tool for
measuring animals’ emotional state and to assess the effects of
experimental manipulations of the emotional state. Outstanding
questions for future research on measuring judgment bias in
animals relevant for both animal welfare research and biomedical
research are discussed.
DISCRIMINATION LEARNING
To successfully perform in a JBT, an animal has to first
learn to discriminate between a stimulus (or set of stimuli)
that predicts a positive consequence (S+) and a stimulus
(or set of stimuli) that predicts a negative consequence
(S−; see Figure 1). Once the animal has mastered this
discrimination, at least one ambiguous stimulus is introduced
that lies somewhere between the original stimuli, i.e., judgment
bias is tested in situations where animals make decisions
under ambiguity (Mendl et al., 2011; for an example, see
Figure 2).
Two classes of JBTs can be distinguished: Go/Go and Go/No-
go tasks. Go/No-go requires suppression of response at S−,
whereas in Go/Go tasks the animal responds to both types of
stimuli with an active response (Murphy et al., 2013).
In both Go/Go and Go/No-go tasks, the animal learns to
discriminate between:
1. A favorable reward (large reward, immediate reward)
and a less favorable reward (small reward, delayed
reward), or
2. A positively valenced outcome (e.g., large food reward) and
a negatively valenced outcome (e.g., small, less palatable food
reward, or food with a bitter taste, no reward). In some cases,
the negative outcomes consists of exposure to aversive noise
or a frightening stimulus, such as a mild electric foot shock
(e.g., Harding et al., 2004), a blower (e.g., Destrez et al., 2013),
a dog (e.g., Doyle et al., 2011a), swaying a plastic bag in front
of the animal (e.g., Douglas et al., 2012), i.e., consequences
on a different modality than the consequences associated with
the S+.
JUDGMENT BIAS TASKS
Cues used in JBTs are spatial (e.g., Briefer and McElligott,
2013; Destrez et al., 2013; Kis et al., 2015); visual (e.g., Salmeto
et al., 2011); auditory (e.g., Murphy et al., 2013), olfactory
(e.g., Boleij et al., 2012; see Figure 1), or a combination of
different stimulus classes (Douglas et al., 2012). In the latter
case it may be difficult to define ambiguous cues and their
scaling on the continuum from S+ to S−. A large variety
of testing equipment is used for judgment bias testing such
as the home cage (e.g., Boleij et al., 2012), runways (e.g.,
Salmeto et al., 2011), open fields (e.g., Destrez et al., 2012),
or mazes with arms radiating from a start box (e.g., Briefer
and McElligott, 2013; see ‘‘Supplementary Figure 1’’). Owing
to the large range of animal species that has been tested in
JBTs, species-specific modifications are necessary, concerning
the size and layout of the testing arena (if any; e.g., dogs have
been tested in their owner’s home: Karagiannis et al., 2015),
the stimuli (cues) used; the type of response required (Go/Go,
Go/No-go); the type of experimental manipulation used to affect
emotion, and the type of consequences as result of the response
to a cue (Figure 2; for an example see also Murphy et al.,
2013).
PEAK SHIFT
When considering the use and results of JBTs, it should also
be taken into account that basic psychological mechanisms such
as generalization gradients and peak shift may play a role in
responses to ambiguous stimuli in judgment bias paradigms.
Generally, judgment bias paradigms start with the acquisition
of a simple discrimination task, in which one stimulus provides
a desired outcome (S+) and another stimulus provides an
undesired outcome (S−). Thus, in Go/No-go tasks, responding
(in whatever form the task requires) to the S+ increases, while
responding to the S− decreases. This does not apply to Go/Go
tasks, wheremaintenance of active responding to both the S+ and
the S− is required.
It has been shown in a number of species, including humans,
that when animals are trained using one S+ and then tested using
stimuli similar to but not exactly the same as the S+, responses
will be highest to the stimuli nearest to the original S+. This
is called a generalization gradient (see Figure 3; Cheng et al.,
1997). The response rate to intermediate stimuli found between
an S+ and S− is thought to be predicted by the interaction
between the two generalization gradients (Hanson, 1957; Kalish
and Guttman, 1957, 1959).
The distribution of responses in a generalization gradient
around the S+ are usually symmetrical if only one stimulus
is used. However, if a second stimulus is used (as in most
JBTs), the peak of responses to the S+ may shift to a cue
further from the S− (Ghirlanda and Enquist, 2003), a process
termed peak shift. This particularly occurs if the S+ and S−
are relatively similar to start with. A complicating factor for
Go/No-go tasks is that it is difficult to assess whether there
is a shift in the generalization gradient surrounding the S−,
as there is generally a low response rate or no response at
all to the S−, which predicts an undesired outcome (such
as no reward). Results from studies specifically analyzing the
responses to the S− seem to indicate that there is also a
peak-shift in S− responses (Hanson, 1959), though it is not
clear whether this is to the same degree as the influence on
S+ responding. If peak shift differentially affects generalization
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of judgment bias training and testing using visual, olfactory, spatial, or auditory cues, or a combination of cues
from different stimulus dimensions (inspired by Bateson et al., 2011; Mendl et al., 2011). The experimental manipulation that is believed to affect emotion
precedes the training phase (A; Scenario 1) or the testing phase (B; Scenario 2). Refreshment of the discrimination acquired during the training phase may be
necessary, if the experimental manipulation preceding phase (B) lasts for a longer time period. An example of scenario 1 is studying the effects of growing up in
different housing systems, whereas scenario 2 may be applied in a study assessing the effects of shorter lasting experimental manipulations, such as confinement,
on emotion. Phase (B) may be repeated multiple times (e.g., Douglas et al., 2012) to test the effects of different experimental manipulations in the same animal.
Specific challenges and limitations may be connected to the different phases. See Figure 2 for an example of the specific contingencies connected with responding
to S+, S− and ambiguous cues.
gradients surrounding the S+ and S−, then responding to
ambiguous stimuli surrounding the S+ and S− may also be
differently affected.
For a better understanding of the processes underlying
judgment bias, it may be necessary to address the generalization
gradients around the discriminative stimuli used. This may
include presenting ambiguous stimuli that are outside the values
range between S+ and S− (see Figure 3) to determine the role
that peak shift may play in responding in JBTs (Ghirlanda and
Enquist, 2003, p. 20).
STATE VS. TRAIT
Faustino et al. (2015) suggest that judgment bias may reflect
either a state or a trait. However, JBTs have commonly been
used to measure the affective state of an animal. Modulation
of judgment bias through situational or contextual factors
which can be observed as within-individual variability (e.g.,
by providing an enriched living environment, stress, or mood-
enhancing drugs) is characteristic of a state. Emotional trait
can be considered as a constant that is a permanent feature
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FIGURE 2 | Example of the exact contingencies connected with responding to the different cues presented during the testing phase (see Figure 1B)
in a judgment bias tasks (JBT; programmed consequences of choices as used in Murphy et al., 2013). Under these or similar testing conditions, the animal
already has been trained to respond correctly to the S+ and S−. As the response to the ambiguous cues does not yield reward, the animal may learn that these cues
represent a new class of stimuli.
of the individual (Ramos and Mormède, 1998) i.e., may be the
expression of a specific phenotype of an individual (Faustino
et al., 2015). Similarly, Strelau (2001, p. 311) defined trait as
a relatively stable and individual-specific generalized tendency
to behave or react in a certain way expressed in a variety
of situations (see also Figure 4). In order to assess a trait
(which is stable over time), the test(s) used must yield highly
replicable results (Carter et al., 2013). A trait thus is considered
a permanent characteristic, whereas a state is considered as
a transient condition that is only observable at particular
moments (see also Fridhandler, 1986; Koski, 2011; Carter et al.,
2013).
Anxiety, for example, can be seen as a trait, or a state. Trait
anxiety is defined as the intrinsic basal anxiety characteristic of
an individual, which does not vary from moment to moment,
while state anxiety is defined as the anxiety that an individual
experiences at a particular moment in time (Lister, 1990).
Trait anxiety is determined by genetic factors, environmental
FIGURE 3 | Discrimination between S+ and S−: Gradients around S+ and S− are depicted as Gaussian distributions. This distribution reflects the
phenomenon of “generalization”, in which stimuli that are more similar to an S are more likely to elicit a similar response. Generalization gradients, and specifically
interactions between the gradients around the S+ and S−, may play a role in responding in JBTs, independent of the judgment bias of the subject. Peak shift, in
which the peak of a generalization gradient surrounding an S+ shifts away from the S− (see dotted lines), may also influence responding to ambiguous stimuli.
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FIGURE 4 | Measuring trait vs. state. Repeatedly testing emotional state (e.g., across the lifespan of an animal) may yield information about its emotional trait,
i.e., the behavior indicative for a particular trait needs to be repeatable (Carter et al., 2013). In this hypothetical example, the JBT and some other tasks that are
believed to assess emotional state are applied multiple times (for an example, see Bethell and Koyama, 2015). Possible consequences of repeated testing are
summarized. The description of the concepts trait and state are from Strelau (2001 p. 317, Table 2).
influences and gene by environment interactions. Theoretically
animals that have a higher trait anxiety respond to dangerous
situations more frequently and with a greater intensity than
individuals lower in trait anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1984). More
anxious individuals thus have a higher level of trait anxiety
and in threatening situations probably also higher levels of
state anxiety. The difficulty with state anxiety is that the level
of anxiety that is measured depends on both the situation
and the level of trait anxiety of the individual. The most
reliable measure of the anxiety characteristic of an animal
or human thus would be a measure of trait anxiety, and not
of state anxiety. In animals it remains to be investigated
how to make a distinction between state and trait anxiety.
Human studies revealed that judgment bias is influenced by
trait anxiety (as measured by questionnaires; see for example
Eysenck et al., 1991; Mathews and MacLeod, 1994) as well as
state anxiety (Mathews and MacLeod, 1994; Anderson et al.,
2012). However, traits are not static; they can change gradually
over time under the influence of environmental factors (Strelau,
2001).
For further validation of JBTs, the animal’s behavior during
the testing phase should be correlated with behavior in other
tasks that are believed to assess emotional states and/or traits.
For rodents, these may be tests such as the OF test, the LD
test, the elevated PM, the novel object test, and/or the modified
hole board, to name a few (e.g., van der Staay et al., 1990;
Duncan and Keller, 2011; see Figure 4). In non-rodent species,
these tasks may be less adequate and other tasks validated for
those particular species must be applied. Some studies have
compared JBT performance to another test of emotionality.
Judgment bias has been shown to correlate with anxiety in
pigs as measured by a novel object test (Carreras et al., 2016).
Pessimistic judgment bias was positively correlated with a more
fearful response during the novel object test. Rats which laugh
when tickled (a confirmed behavioral signal of positive emotional
state) have a more positive judgment bias than rats which
don’t (Rygula et al., 2012). Destrez et al. (2012) found that
lambs treated with an anxiolytic showed a positive judgment
bias and were less fearful during isolation and suddenness
tests. When studying the responses of laying hens in different
tests of emotionality, some correlations were found between
measured parameters during a JBT, a novel object test and an
anticipation test. However, no clear relationship between the
tests was found (Wichman et al., 2012). To test specifically
for the effects of emotional traits on judgment bias, examining
possible correlations with tasks that measure personality traits
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is necessary. For example, repeated comparisons of baseline
judgment bias of individuals with high vs. low trait anxiety would
be valuable. Individual differences in baseline judgment bias have
been reported (e.g., Starling et al., 2014). Repeated judgment
bias testing has been applied to a small sample of chimpanzees
(n = 3). Individual differences in judgment bias were found,
which remained stable across five test sessions (spanning a
time period of 1–2 weeks; Bateson and Nettle, 2015). When a
similar study was performed with pigs, no consistent results were
found between two test sessions (with a 5 week intermittent
period; Carreras et al., 2015). In rats, repeated testing of baseline
judgment bias has produced stable results, which correlate with
traits such as motivation and sensitivity to stress (Rygula et al.,
2013, 2015b).
Though replicability and stability of result is a basic
requirement of a trait, this may be difficult to demonstrate
empirically. Unfortunately, the order of testing may affect
behavior in subsequent tests (e.g., McIlwain et al., 2001; Blokland
et al., 2012). This is an observation that may also complicate a
correlational approach (e.g., factor analysis) to validating JBTs.
To the best of our knowledge, neither the correlations between
different tests that are believed to assess emotion with JBTs, nor
the effects of repeated (or longitudinal) assessment has yet been
studied systematically.
CUES ON ONE SINGLE STIMULUS
DIMENSION OR ON DIFFERENT
STIMULUS DIMENSIONS?
There are several potential concerns related to the choice of
stimulus dimension(s) when preparing a JBT design. There
may be variation between animals in their capabilities to
differentiate between cues. For example, when using auditory
cues, the accuracy of perceiving differences between tones may
be different for good and poor listeners in learning the original
tone discrimination (see, e.g., Amitay et al., 2005). For olfactory
stimuli, it needs to be ensured that mixtures of the S+ and S−
odors are distinguishable as such, i.e., are not simply regarded as a
novel odor, but as intermediates between S+ and S− (Dreumont-
Boudreau et al., 2006). Differences in ability to discriminate
between learned and ambiguous stimuli may similarly affect
studies using visual or tactile cues. Additionally, there may be a
non-linear relationship between the perception of the originally
acquired S+/S− and the intermediate stimuli, i.e., due to the
sensory capabilities of the species studied, the scaling of cues
may not be perceived as intended. For example, what is intended
to be an intermediate ambiguous cue may be perceived as
having a higher similarity to the S+ than to S−. The dimension
and scaling of the cues used thus may affect performance
in JBTs by affecting ambiguity. Therefore, it is important to
adjust the dimension and scaling of cues to the species studied
(e.g., auditory cues used in several rat studies are adapted to
the species’ audiogram (e.g., Enkel et al., 2010; Rygula et al.,
2013)).
A number of studies used cues from different dimensions.
Although such a methodology might make discrimination
between cues easier, they limit the interpretation of JBT results
(Nogueira et al., 2015). Graded stimuli on a unidimensional
scale allow for the prediction of response patterns (see
Figure 5). When different dimensions are used for S+ and S−,
ambiguous cues can no longer be considered as intermediate.
For example, Salmeto et al. (2011) used a series of chicken
to owl morphs, where the S+ was the mirror image of the
tested chicken, whereas the S− and the different morphs
were silhouettes, printed on cards (the mirror image added
an extra dimension to the S+, namely movement). When
comparing responses to a previous experiment using a chicken
silhouette as S+, it became clear that the chicks responded
differently to the mirror than to printed stimuli, with decreased
latencies to respond to the moving mirror images. When
the ambiguous stimuli are unrelated to the trained reference
cues, there is a risk of measuring response to novelty instead
of ambiguity. For example, using wild peccary as subjects,
Nogueira et al. (2015) used categorically different auditory
stimuli (whistle and horn as S+ and S−, bell as ambiguous).
Ambiguity is characterized by the possibility to interpret a
situation or stimulus in two (or more) distinct ways, i.e.,
in the case of JBTs ambiguous cues can be interpreted as
predicting a similar outcome to either S+ or S−. In order
to obtain results which are interpretable as responses to
ambiguity, it is suggested to only use cues on a single
dimension.
LOSS OF AMBIGUITY WITHIN A SMALL
NUMBER OF TESTING TRIALS
It is common practice in JBTs to leave test trials (i.e.,
presentations of ambiguous stimuli) unrewarded (see Figure 2).
Such a lack of reward will stand out after extensive training
where rewards were always present. This will facilitate learning
about unrewarded ambiguous trials (Jamieson et al., 2012).
As a result, repeated testing in JBTs could lead to a loss of
ambiguity, as the animals will learn to associate the ambiguous
stimuli with a specific outcome. This could influence the
animals’ subsequent choices during test trials and thereby lead
to false conclusions of measured judgment bias (Doyle et al.,
2010b). Such possible confounding effects of unrewarded testing
trials have been recognized in numerous studies. Brilot et al.
(2010) found that their study subjects (starlings) increased the
response latencies as testing progressed, while failing to detect a
cognitive bias. They concluded that their birds quickly learned
that the ambiguous trials were never rewarded and therefore
became slower to respond to ambiguous cues. Multiple other
studies report a loss of ambiguity as a possible cause for
increased response latencies of their study subjects (Doyle et al.,
2011b; Sanger et al., 2011; Starling, 2012; Destrez et al., 2014;
Starling et al., 2014; Verbeek et al., 2014; Karagiannis et al.,
2015). In addition to an increased response latency, Murphy
et al. (2013) found that their pigs also decrease the number of
optimistic responses with repeated testing. Doyle et al. (2010a)
suggested that a loss of ambiguity could even explain why
stressed sheep responded more pessimistically than their non-
stressed controls.
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FIGURE 5 | Judgment bias represented schematically. Note that the bias is stronger to the extent to which the response lies in the darker area. In Go/Go tasks,
the latency to approach a cue is usually analyzed (A), whereas the likelihood (or the proportion of animals in a treatment group) is usually analyzed in Go/No-go tasks
(B). Note that, depending on the criterion of defining a no-go response, graphs (A) and (B) may look quite different (i.e., they are not merely mirrored along the
vertical axis; see, for example, Douglas et al., 2012; Gordon and Rogers, 2015). Note that rather often, experiments conceived as Go/No-go tasks report latencies to
approach, because animals didn’t learn to suppress responding in the no-go trials (e.g., Bateson et al., 2015).
As mild stress may enhance learning (Mendl et al., 2009),
the stressed animals could simply have learned about the lack of
rewards during ambiguous trials faster than the control group.
Similar conclusions have been drawn in other studies (Destrez
et al., 2012, 2013; Scollo et al., 2014). A study dedicated solely
to the effect of repeated testing in absence of any experimental
manipulations or changes in environment found that sheep
develop a reluctance to respond during ambiguous test trials
(Doyle et al., 2010b). As there was no explanation for this
change in behavior related to a change in their emotional state,
an increase in pessimism seems unlikely. Rather, this study
supports the notion that animals may learn about the outcome
of ambiguous trials with repeated testing and change their
responses accordingly.
Several possible solutions to the problem of loss of ambiguity
have been suggested. Use of a secondary reinforcer during
training and testing was successfully applied in a study by
Keen et al. (2014). In addition to a high and low food reward,
their bears were also reinforced with a clicker to maintain
responsiveness. During ambiguous testing trials, no food rewards
were given, but reinforcement with the clicker continued.
A secondary reinforcing audio cue has also been used in a study
with Rhesus macaques (Bethell et al., 2012). Another measure
to reduce learning about the outcome of test trials is a partial
reinforcement ratio schedule for training and control trials.
For example, Neave et al. (2013) used partial reinforcement of
positive trials during training. Although the punishment rate for
negative trials remained 100%, they reduced the reward rate for
positive trials to 50%. Using this training procedure, their calves
learned to have lower expectations of reward during ambiguous
trials. Partial reinforcement of training and control trials has also
been successfully applied in various other studies (Bateson and
Matheson, 2007; Matheson et al., 2008; Bethell et al., 2012;
Richter et al., 2012; Neave et al., 2013; Daros et al., 2014; Bateson
et al., 2015; Bethell and Koyama, 2015).
The number of learning opportunities about the outcomes
of trials during judgment bias testing can also be reduced by
minimizing the number of ambiguous test trials. In a study by
Vögeli et al. (2014), sheep were subjected to three test sessions
of five trials, with each session containing only one single
ambiguous trial. No reduction in visits to unrewarded ambiguous
probes was reported. Similarly, studies by Rygula et al. (2013,
2015b) report stable judgment bias for their rats by using
a relatively small number of ambiguous trials in comparison
to positive/negative trials. Although these studies support the
notion that limiting the exposure to unrewarded ambiguous
probes can prevent loss of ambiguity, this measure would also
reduce the number of trials that can be used to estimate effects
of experimental manipulations on judgment bias. A reduced
number of ambiguous trials may make the JBT results prone to
chance findings. Using a between subjects design would at least
minimize the number of exposures to ambiguous stimuli per
animal (Brilot et al., 2010).
A final suggestion has been to reward ambiguous trials
(Murphy, 2015, pp. 185–187; see also Carreras et al., 2015).
This was shown to lead to a maintenance of optimistic choosing
throughout test sessions, whereas unrewarded test trials lead to
a decrease in optimistic choice. However, such a design may
still lead to associative learning concerning the outcomes of
ambiguous trials, rendering them no longer ambiguous.
Surprisingly, Bateson and Nettle (2015) used no specific
measures to avoid loss of ambiguity, yet found no effects
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of repeated testing in three chimpanzees with respect to the
latencies to react to intermediate stimuli. Consequently, they
conclude that their JBT is suited for longitudinal assessment
of welfare in this species. The authors ascribe their apparent
maintenance of ambiguity to the difficulty of their discrimination
task (paper cones of 20% vs. 60% gray, with intermediate shades
as ambiguous stimuli). However, their very small sample size
(n = 3) increases the chance of false positive findings (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1971). Therefore, repeated testing with a larger
sample size would be beneficial to further support their method
of preventing loss of ambiguity.
Loss of ambiguity can become a considerable limitation
to JBTs, as it renders them ineffective for the detection of
changes in affective state (Brilot et al., 2010). Rather, it may
cause animals to base their performance on associative learning
as testing progresses. This could lead to incorrect conclusions
about the effects of experimental manipulations on an animal’s
affective state. Therefore, it is recommended to implement
precautions against loss of ambiguity, such as the use of a partial
reinforcement schedule during training and testing (e.g., Bateson
et al., 2015). The specific design of a study will determine which
precautions are the most suitable. Also, it is important to exclude
loss of ambiguity as a possible explanation for results. This can
be done by testing for changes in response to ambiguous stimuli
in the absence of experimental manipulation (Neave et al., 2013;
Daros et al., 2014).
GO/NO-GO VS. GO/GO TASKS (ACTIVE
CHOICE TASKS)
In an article by Baciadonna and McElligott (2015), of the
judgment bias publications reviewed, approximately 70% (22 of
the 32 publications) were designed as a Go/No-go task. Of the
studies summarized in the Table 1 of ‘‘Supplementary Material’’,
approximately 50% was of the Go/No-go type. Matheson et al.
(2008) developed an active choice task for starlings in which the
subject must respond to the S+ and S− with the same operant
behavior (e.g., pecking a key (S+) associated with immediate
reward, or a key (S−) associated with delayed reward). Other
variants have since been developed such as an active choice task
for pigs, in which responding in the goal box associated with
the S+ yields a large reward, and responding to the goal box
associated with the S−, yields a small reward (Murphy et al.,
2013).
Theoretically, the main difference between Go/Go tasks and
Go/No-go tasks is that in Go/Go or active choice tasks the
animal is required to make an active response to both the S+
and S−, whereas in Go/No-go tasks, the animal is required to
suppress a response to the S−. In Go/No-go tasks, a cut off
criterion is defined to distinguish between the two response
classes. Usually, trials in which an animal did not respond within
a pre-determined cut-off time are scored as No-go (see Figure 5).
Alternatively, the median response time—an approach that
determines the cut-off within a preset period empirically—serves
to distinguish between Go (latency to respond below median
latency) and No-go (latency to respond above median) responses
(e.g., Wichman et al., 2012). In both instances, the proportion
of animals responding in one of the two classes (Go, No-
go) is analyzed. The selected cut-off time may determine the
discriminating ability of the test.
The response suppression required for Go/No-go tasks may
influence JBT results, as behavioral inhibition is thought to be
influenced by emotion (Cyders and Smith, 2007). Moreover,
in Go/No-go tasks, No-go responses could be considered an
omission to react, rather than a pessimistic response (Guldimann
et al., 2015). Active choice tasks circumvent this possible
confounding factor of motivation by requiring active responses
for both optimistic and pessimistic choices (Hales et al., 2014).
As active choice tasks do not require behavioral inhibition
and allow for omissions to be measured separately from
optimistic/pessimistic responses, they may be more suited for
measuring judgment bias than Go/No-go tasks (Murphy et al.,
2013). It should be noted that, in practice, a Go/No-go and a
Go/Go task are not necessarily mutually exclusive (see Figure 5).
If the trial doesn’t stop when reaching the criterion of No-go, but
lasts e.g., for two times the criterion duration, then the data can
also be analyzed as reflecting active choice responses (see Douglas
et al., 2012; Carreras et al., 2015; Gordon and Rogers, 2015).
Many different criteria have been used for mastering the basic
discrimination task preceding judgment bias testing. In both
Go/Go and Go/No-go tasks similar criteria are used, usually
based on accuracy (60 to 90% correct responding to S+ and S−,
Anderson et al., 2013; Keen et al., 2014; Rygula et al., 2015a),
latency (shorter latencies to respond to S+ than to S−, Briefer
Freymond et al., 2014; Kis et al., 2015), or running speed (faster
to S+ than S−, Karagiannis et al., 2015). Specific to No-go trials,
a predetermined number of no-approaches of S− (Sanger et al.,
2011) has been used for determining when animals had learned
the basic discrimination. The learning criterion must be reached
over a predetermined number of training days, trials, or trials
within a number of days. All animals that did not reach the
criterion within this maximum are excluded from testing with
ambiguous cues (e.g., Müller et al., 2012). Sometimes additional
criteria, such as that the animal makes no omissions in a fixed
number of trials (Anderson et al., 2013), are used.
In some studies, differences between the response to the
S+ and S−, confirmed statistically by Wilcoxon test (e.g., Kis
et al., 2015) or Mann-Whitney U-test (e.g., Starling, 2012) were
used as criterion. It has not yet been investigated how the
learning criterion, i.e., the level of mastering the original S+/S−
discrimination, affects the sensitivity of subsequent testing with
ambiguous cues. It is conceivable that a weak criterion decreases
the likelihood to detect a judgment bias.
TRAINING AND TESTING IN ISOLATION
VS. TESTING IN THE SOCIAL GROUP
Though not unique for JBTs, testing social animals individually,
without direct contact to its group, may increase the stress level
and/or decrease the willingness of an animal to learn the task
and/or perform the required responses. Extensive habituation
and pre-training may be necessary before judgment bias can be
individually assessed (see Krasheninnikova and Schneider, 2014).
For example, pigs need extensive habituation before they can
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be trained and tested individually in JBTs (Murphy et al., 2013,
2015).
Training and testing in a group setting is another solution
to problems associated with individual testing of social
animals. However, group testing is likely also accompanied by
methodological issues. To date, only one study has used group
training for a JBT. Training white-lipped peccary in isolation was
unsuccessful in a study by Nogueira et al. (2015), necessitating
training within a group setting. During discrimination training,
the animals responded to the S+ (approached a food bowl
containing rewards) as a group. A similar method was used
to acquire correct No-Go responses to the S−. The authors
mention that extra food rewards were provided when higher-
ranking individuals were monopolizing the food bowl. This
implies that higher-ranking individuals received more rewards
for correct responses than lower-ranking animals, possibly
influencing results of discrimination training. Also, differential
expectations of reward could have been established, with higher-
ranking individuals experiencing a bigger contrast between
rewarded and non-rewarded trials. Only animals which reached
a criterion level of performance were used for individual
judgment bias testing. Another potential limitation of training
in a group setting is the difficulty of determining individual
performance. Did all animals truly acquire the discrimination
between S+ and S−, or were some individuals simply copying
the responses of their group members? This can only be
established by acquiring individual results (e.g., by individual
training or by evaluating responses to reference tones during
individual testing). No systematic comparisons of JBT training
and testing in isolation and in social groups have been
reported so far. Due to the many potential limitations of
training and testing in a group setting, it does not seem
likely to be advantageous over individual habituation of social
animals.
The effects of (short-term) isolation of social animals,
applied as an experimental manipulation of the emotional
state preceding judgment bias testing, have been explored
in several species. Social isolation affected judgment bias in
chicks, with duration of the isolation period having specific
effects on JBT performance. A pre-testing isolation period
of 5 min induced increased pessimistic responses, while an
isolation period of 60 min also decreased optimistic responding
(Salmeto et al., 2011; Hymel and Sufka, 2012). For pigs and
laying hens, no effect of short-term social isolation on JBT
performance was found (Düpjan et al., 2013; Murphy et al.,
2013; Hernandez et al., 2015). Only the study by Murphy et al.
(2013) mentions habituation of the animals prior to training
and testing, possibly explaining why no effect of social isolation
was found. When male rats are moved from group housing to
individual cages, their rate of optimistic responding decreased
(no effect was found for female rats). However, as enrichment
and available shelter were also removed when moving the rats,
these could have been confounding factors in this study (Barker
et al., 2016). Together, these studies suggest that habituation
of social animals to the training and testing conditions is
sufficient to avoid a confounding influence of stress during
testing.
EXCLUDING ANIMALS THAT DID NOT
PASS THE TRAINING PRECEDING
JUDGMENT BIAS TESTING
Many judgment bias studies report the exclusion of animals that
failed to reach a required criterion during training (e.g., Starling,
2012; Starling et al., 2014; Verbeek et al., 2014; Bethell and
Koyama, 2015; Hernandez et al., 2015). For example, Wichman
et al. (2012) reported 10 out of 38 chickens were unable to
acquire the discrimination between rewarded and unrewarded
trials, in spite of a long training period. These animals could
therefore not be subjected to judgment bias testing. Similarly,
in group of 18 white-lipped peccary, four adult individuals
did not learn the basic discrimination in a Go/No-go auditory
discrimination task, and were consequently not tested in the
subsequent JBT (Nogueira et al., 2015). In a study by Brajon
et al. (2015), only 59% of their 54 pigs completed the training
preceding judgment bias testing. Consequently, all results and
conclusions from JBTs are based on the study subjects that were
capable of learning the discrimination task. If not all animals
are able to reach the preset learning criterion, the samples are
biased toward ‘‘learners’’. The larger the proportion of excluded
‘‘non-learners’’ is, the more biased a study is, and consequently,
the less the results can be generalized. Development of tests
that need less pre-training, e.g., by ensuring the discrimination
training is better suited to the natural abilities/behaviors of the
studied species, may allow for more animals to participate in
subsequent judgment bias testing. Developing discrimination
tasks which the studied animals are able to master fairly easily
may also prevent selective loss of animals in experimentally
manipulated groups. For example, possible effects of stress on
learning could lead to animals undergoing a particular treatment
(e.g., induced anxiety) being more likely to fail to pass the
training phase (Mendl et al., 2009; Conrad, 2010). Increasing the
difficulty of discrimination training may increase the likelihood
of a larger proportion of non-learners in a specific treatment
group.
USABILITY FOR ASSESSING ANIMAL
WELFARE
In animal welfare research, JBTs have been applied to a wide
range of species that are commonly kept in captivity for
a variety of reasons (e.g., production animals such as pigs,
Brajon et al., 2015; laboratory animals such as rats, Burman
et al., 2008; zoo animals such as Grizzly bears, Keen et al.,
2014; companion animals such as dogs, Titulaer et al., 2013).
Most of these judgment bias studies have been aimed at
investigating the effects of common conditions inherent to life
in captivity. For example, the effects of providing environmental
enrichment have been studied extensively (e.g., Douglas et al.,
2012; Bethell and Koyama, 2015). Also, the effects of common
handling procedures have been frequently tested using JBTs,
such as dehorning procedures in cattle (e.g., Neave et al.,
2013).
According to Bateson and Matheson, (2007 p. 36), ‘‘to
be practically useful as a measure of how animals feel,
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cognitive bias needs to be easy to measure in applied
settings’’. However, many studies needed extensive training
on the basic discrimination task before judgment bias could
be assessed, decreasing the practical applicability of JBTs
as a form of welfare assessment. Additionally, an extensive
training period could mask potential detrimental effects of
experimental manipulation and is considered one of the
most confounding factors in judgment bias test paradigms
(Novak et al., 2015). Acting as cognitive enrichment, training
could improve the welfare/affective state of the study subjects
(Carlstead and Shepherdson, 2000; Puppe et al., 2007; Pomerantz
and Terkel, 2009; Zebunke et al., 2011; Guldimann et al.,
2015). In spite of negative affect manipulations, this could
lead to optimistic responses from subjects (Düpjan et al.,
2013). In line with this expectation, in preparation of
judgment bias testing, Svendsen (2012) trained farmed mink
categorized as fearful or as explorative, to induce a positive
affective state. Whereas the fearful mink behaved more
explorative at the end of training, an opposite effect of
training was found in the mink categorized as explorative:
these animals were rated as less positive post-training, possibly
due to frustration about the absence of expected rewards
during later training sessions. Svendsen et al. (2012, p. 366)
cautions that ‘‘(. . .) studies that involve induced affective
states and a lot of training of the animals to assess their
welfare, such as the cognitive bias method, need to be
interpreted carefully as the handling and training has a different
effect on animals in different affective states’’. Consequently,
future research should focus on the question of whether
training for a JBT itself modulates the animal’s emotional
state.
The sensitivity of judgment bias to detect effects of
experimental manipulations on emotions has not yet
unequivocally been established. For example, in a study by
Keen et al. (2014) the JBT was unable to detect differential
effects of environmental enrichment methods in bears. Although
behavioral observations showed that the different types of
enrichment were valued differently by the bears (some items
were interacted with more than others), this did not result
in differences in measured judgment bias. It is possible that
providing enrichment did not produce a measurable increase
in judgment bias because the JBT was not sensitive enough
to detect this change in affective state. However, lack of
effect to be detected is another possibility, as the bears were
already housed in enriched environments. The addition of an
extra enrichment item may not have produced a measurable
improvement in affective state to begin with. Similarly, another
judgment bias study did not discriminate between the welfare
of short and long term kenneled dogs (Titulaer et al., 2013).
These similar results between animals which are assumed
to be experiencing different levels of welfare, could have
been considered a result of the lack of sensitivity of JBTs.
However, additional measures of welfare (such as behavioral
observations and stress hormone levels) did not differ between
the groups either. This study shows the importance of validating
judgment bias results by comparing them with other measures
of welfare.
Reviewing JBTs as tools to assess welfare in farm animals,
Baciadonna and McElligott (2015) conclude that these tasks
are sensitive to manipulations that induce negative emotions,
whereas experimental evidence for sensitivity to manipulations
that induce positive emotions is yet weak. This lack of evidence
for sensitivity to positive judgment bias could be due to a lack
of scientific attention. The majority of judgment bias studies
measure the effects of manipulations which are expected to
produce a negative affective state. Studies investigating optimistic
judgment bias are much less common. For example, Rygula
et al. (2012) have shown that laughing rats (displaying a clear
behavioral indication of positive affective state) have a more
positive judgment bias than rats which don’t laugh when tickled.
As improvement of animal welfare relies on both the reduction
of negative emotions and the promotion of positive emotions
(Boissy et al., 2007), studies aimed at the sensitivity of JBTs to
positive emotions are important.
USABILITY FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
JBTs have been used as tools for affective state assessment
in biomedical research. The majority of these studies have
used rodents as their subjects (e.g., mice, Boleij et al., 2012;
rats, Kregiel et al., 2016), reflecting the common use of
rodents as animal models in biomedical research. In most
of the biomedical studies, experimental manipulations were
performed prior to testing (Scenario 2 in Figure 1). In such
experiments, all study subjects experience similar conditions
during training. This is in contrast to many welfare studies,
which alter housing conditions, etc., prior to training.
Studies which have different conditions for experimental
groups prior to or during training, apply experimental
manipulations that could affect both the discrimination
training preceding judgment bias testing and responding in the
JBT proper.
The main aim of judgment bias studies in biomedical research
has been to investigate effects of experimental manipulations
expected to affectmood in animalmodels ofmood disorders such
as depression and/or anxiety. Most of these studies have tested
the effects of anxiolytics and/or anti-depressants on judgment
bias performance (e.g., Doyle et al., 2011a; Destrez et al., 2012;
Hymel and Sufka, 2012; Anderson et al., 2013; Rygula et al.,
2014a,b, 2015c).
It is important that results of JBTs are generalizable to other
species (e.g., results should simulate the clinical condition of
depression/anxiety in humans and inform about the effects
of therapeutics believed to modulate these clinical conditions;
van der Staay, 2006). If this is not the case, the translational
value of judgment bias measurements in non-human animals
may be limited. JBTs appear to be a useful tool for studying
animal models of depression and anxiety. Multiple studies have
found responses comparable to those found in human studies of
judgment bias (Enkel et al., 2010; Salmeto et al., 2011; Hymel and
Sufka, 2012; Richter et al., 2012; Papciak et al., 2013; Kloke et al.,
2014; Rygula et al., 2014a, 2015a; Kregiel et al., 2016).
JBTs appear to have particular potential to differentiate
between anxiety disorders and depression. Although both mood
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disorders result in a negative affective state, they produce
different response profiles in the JBT. In humans, depression
is expressed by a decrease in optimistic responses combined
with an increase in pessimistic responses. Individuals suffering
from anxiety only display increased pessimistic responding
(MacLeod and Byrne, 1996; Miranda and Mennin, 2007).
These findings have been replicated in judgment bias studies
using a chick model of anxiety and depression (Salmeto
et al., 2011; Hymel and Sufka, 2012). Chicks in an anxiety-
like state displayed more pessimistic behaviors in response
to ambiguous aversive cues (i.e., ambiguous cue near S−)
and to intermediate ambiguous cues. Chicks in a depression-
like state behaved similarly, but in addition displayed less
optimistic behaviors in response to ambiguous cues near
the S+. These results highlight the importance of using a
spectrum of ambiguous stimuli, ranging from near-negative
to near-positive. Different same-valence affective states (such
as depression and anxiety) may produce different responses
to these different forms of ambiguous cues (Kloke et al.,
2014).
The translational value of biomedical judgment bias studies
is of particular importance, as results are used for comparison
with humans and/or other model species. Therefore, differences
between species in baseline responding during a JBT require
attention (e.g., is a pessimistic response caused by induction of
a negative affective state or by a trait of the studied species, see
‘‘State vs. Trait’’ Section). Several studies have reported a baseline
judgment bias of their study subjects. Using test designs with
reward and punishment, both rats and BALB/c mice displayed
a baseline negative judgment bias. They showed punishment
avoidance during ambiguous cue presentation (Boleij et al.,
2012; Anderson et al., 2013; Rygula et al., 2015c). These
findings could have been a direct result of the test design and
comparisons to studies using a discrimination task based on
favorable/less favorable reward would be valuable. One study
found a baseline positive judgment bias in rats and ascribed
this optimism to the favorable testing conditions, i.e., the
possibility of food reward and exploration of novel environment,
further indicating effects of test design on baseline judgment
bias performance (McGuire et al., 2015). Rygula et al. (2014b)
reported a difference in baseline judgment bias between groups of
rats used for separate experiments, citing this as a possible reason
for differences in results found after experimental manipulation.
This finding implies that even within-species/strain differences
in baseline judgment bias are a possibility that needs to be
taken into account. In support of this argument, several studies
mention individual variation in judgment bias as a possible
influence on their results (Verbeek et al., 2014; Kis et al.,
2015).
Biomedical studies have commonly used JBTs to assess effects
of drug treatments. When tested drugs have side effects, this
could influence behavior in JBTs. One common pharmacological
side effect is a reduction or increase of appetite. Most JBTs use
food as a reward for correct responses to S+, with numerous
studies also using (less palatable) food as punishment predicted
by S−. When treated study subjects experience a decrease
in appetite, their performance of optimistic behaviors (i.e.,
collecting a food reward) may be reduced independent of
their affective state. Two studies have mentioned a decrease
in appetite as a possible side effect of drug treatments and
both used food reinforcers as part of their experimental design
(Anderson et al., 2013; Rygula et al., 2014b). An increase
in appetite after treatment with the anxiolytic diazepam was
discussed as a possible explanation for the observed negative
judgment bias (pessimistic responses required the intake of
food items with low palatability, see Boleij, 2013). Observing
animals’ responses to S+ and S− could provide an indication
of appetite-related side effects affecting treated subjects. For
instance, when responding during food-rewarded positive trials
remains high, it is unlikely that a change in appetite is responsible
for a change in responding during ambiguous trials. Using an
alternative to food reinforcers will rule out treatment-induced
differences in food motivation altogether (e.g., Kloke et al.,
2014). When food reinforcers have been used, the possibility
of side effects of treatment on the consummatory behavior of
study subjects should be ruled out (Mendl et al., 2009). There
are other common side effects of pharmacological manipulation
to reckon with that potentially influence behavior in JBTs
(e.g., locomotor activity, lethargy). Doyle et al. (2011a), for
example, examined possible side effects affecting the results of
dose response trials in a JBT by examining the behavior and




JBTs may be suited to assess the emotional state of an animal.
Provided that judgment bias can be repeatedly tested in the
same animal over a longer time period (Q.E.D., see ‘‘Discussion’’
above, ‘‘Loss of Ambiguity Within a Small Number of Testing
Trials’’ Section), it may also be suited to assess emotional trait in
animals.
Judgment bias can be tested in a very broad range of species,
from insects to humans, i.e., may allow comparison between
species, and may be suited for translational research. There is a
large variation in test equipment and testing procedures between
and within species (for a recent review see Bethell, 2015; see also
‘‘Supplementary Material, Table 1’’). A huge variation in criteria
is applied for mastering the basic discrimination task. Also, a
large range of computational and statistical methods to analyze
the judgment bias data has been used. Recently, Gygax (2014)
reviewed these methods and gave recommendations, which
already have been critically commented upon (Bateson et al.,
2015). This gamut of statistical analyses hampers comparisons
within and between studies and species.
JBTs have been used in the field of animal welfare research
and in biomedical research. These tasks need to be further
developed and adapted to the species of animals used and
the research questions to be addressed. In welfare assessment
studies, modifications may include the applicability under
non-laboratory conditions, testing of social animals in groups
and increase of the efficacy to train animals on the basic
discrimination task. Owing to the extensive training preceding
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 12 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 119
Roelofs et al. Making Decisions under Ambiguity
judgment bias testing, this task appears to be less suited for
routine monitoring of animal welfare.
In biomedical research, a lengthy training period, preceding
testing with ambiguous stimuli, may be less of a concern, as
drug treatments usually start after completion of learning the
basic discrimination between S+/S−. However, the problem
that ambiguous stimuli may lose their ambiguity very quickly,
enabling collection of data in a few trials only, needs to be solved.
Also, we need to assess whether the task is suited for repeated
testing in a longitudinal design (see also Figure 4).
Many open questions, addressed in the present article, still
need to be answered before JBTs may be considered as a
validated, useful tool in the toolbox of researchers interested in
measuring animal emotions in both the context of animal welfare
studies and biomedical studies.
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